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Abstract
Intermediaries helping individuals and ﬁrms with the government bureaucracy are com-
mon in developing countries. Although such bureaucracy intermediaries are, anecdotally,
linked with corruption and welfare losses, few formal analyses exist.
In our model, a government license can beneﬁt individuals. We study individuals
net gain when acquiring the license through the regular bureaucratic procedure, through
bribing or through intermediaries. For a given procedure, individuals using intermediaries
are better oﬀ than if intermediaries and corruption had not existed. Intermediaries grease
the wheels. We then study incentives of corrupt bureaucrats to create red tape. When
free to choose levels of red tape, bureaucrats implement more red tape and individuals
are unambiguously worse oﬀ in a setting with intermediaries than with direct corruption
only.
Intermediaries can thus improve access to the bureaucracy, but also strengthen in-
centives to create red tape - a potential explanation why license procedures tend to be
long in developing countries.
Keywords: Bureaucracy, Corruption, Intermediaries, Red tape
JEL: D73, O12
E-mail address: anders.fredriksson@fundp.ac.be, Ph.: +32-(0)81-724869, Fax: +32-(0)81-724840
✩In its previous version, the paper was circulated as SITE Working Paper 2010:10. I thank semi-
nar and workshop participants at the IIES and the Department of Economics, Stockholm University;
CRED, University of Namur; CORS, University of S˜ ao Paulo; and conference participants at the NCDE,
ISNIE, the CEPR/BREAD summer school in Development Economics, LACEA and the Ronald Coase
Institute. Feedback from Jakob Svensson is especially appreciated. Thanks to two anonymous refer-
ees for much helpful suggestions. Thanks also to Gani Aldashev, Jean-Marie Baland, Jeanet Bentzen,
Marcus Dejardin, Lowe Ekenberg, Shon Ferguson, Seema Jayachandran, Per Krusell, Victor Lapuente,
Masayuki Kudamatsu, Rocco Macchiavello, Dilip Mookherjee, Annika Nilsson, Stephen Parente, Maria
Perrotta, Jos´ e Mauricio Prado, Sylvia Saes, Bruno Salama, Claes Sandgren, Paulo Eduardo da Silva, Eric
Verhoogen and Decio Zylbersztajn for discussions and comments. Financing from Handelsbanken, and
from the network Actors, Markets, and Institutions in Developing Countries (AMID) of the European
Commission, is greatfully acknowledged. Any errors are the sole responsibility of the author.
11. Introduction
Intermediaries that help individuals and ﬁrms with the government bureaucracy are
present throughout the developing world. Yet, there is a limited understanding of what
such bureaucracy intermediaries do. Although the prevalence of intermediaries is, anec-
dotally, linked with corruption in the government bureaucracy and a welfare loss, there
are few formal analyses of the topic. On the empirical side, there is an almost complete
lack of studies involving bureaucracy intermediaries.
This paper aims at ﬁlling a gap in the theoretical literature on bureaucracy inter-
mediaries. In a model where individuals can get a beneﬁt by going through a license
procedure at the government bureaucracy, we study how individuals’ net gain from the
license is aﬀected when the license can also be acquired through intermediaries. We study
how the incentives of government bureaucrats to create red tape are aﬀected when there
are intermediaries, and what eﬀects such ”endogenous red tape” has on individuals’ gain
from the license. We also endogenize the existence of the intermediary sector itself.
The study focuses on one speciﬁc aspect of what intermediaries can oﬀer individuals
and ﬁrms - time saving. Individuals can acquire the license through the regular procedure,
or by bribing corrupt bureaucrats to get a speedier treatment, or from an intermediary,
which allows for even more time saving. From individuals’ choice of how to acquire the
license, we derive several interesting and novel results.
We ﬁrst show that, ceteris paribus, individuals acquiring licenses through either cor-
rupt bureaucrats or intermediaries are unambiguously better oﬀ than if corruption and
intermediaries had not existed. Second, and importantly, we show that the incentives
of bureaucrats to complicate bureaucratic procedures and add red tape diﬀer in models
with intermediaries. Bureaucrats ﬁnd it optimal to create more red tape when there are
intermediaries. Third, we show that, when corrupt bureaucrats can choose their ”opti-
mal” level of complication of the government bureaucracy, individuals’ net gain is lower
in a model with intermediaries than in a model with ”direct” corruption only.
An additional contribution of the paper is that we endogenize the existence of the
intermediary sector. Whether the sector arises or not, the degree of competition within
the sector, the eﬀect on individuals’ gain from licensing, and bureaucrats’ ”optimal”
choice of the amount of red tape is analyzed in a model with endogenous entry and
oligopolistic competition between intermediaries. We show that as long as entry costs
into intermediation are not too high and when bureaucrats are free to choose the level
of red tape, the intermediary sector exists, license procedures are longer and individuals
are unambiguously worse oﬀ, than without intermediaries.
In order for citizens to acquire a license from the government bureaucracy, a number
of steps typically have to be completed, involving visits to several oﬃces, standing in line,
making diﬀerent payments, etc. Assume there is a beneﬁt of g from such a license and
that the procedure to get the license consists of n steps. As long as costs to acquire the
license are smaller than g, individuals will optimally choose to get it. The lower the cost,
the better oﬀ individuals will be. Importantly, any reduction of license costs will make
available a surplus that would otherwise be lost, for instance in queuing, waiting, going
between diﬀerent oﬃces, etc, as well as on the extensive margin where some individuals
2possibly switch from ”informality”, into getting the license.1
Consider bureaucrats that are interested in capturing the surplus associated with
reducing individuals’ license costs. Apart from legitimate license fees, individuals face
other costs, such as monetary costs for transport, and time costs of queuing, waiting and
going to the oﬃces. It is bureaucrats’ removal of these time costs, against payments from
individuals, that is the focus in this paper. The model is inspired by the fact, especially
true in developing countries, that individuals and ﬁrms getting licenses typically have to
spend considerable amounts of time in completing license procedures, including visiting
multiple government oﬃces at diﬀerent locations and at diﬀerent points in time.2 We refer
to the reduction in such time costs as ”speed money corruption” for which individuals pay
”bribes” to bureaucrats. We take the principal-agent relationship between bureaucrats
and the government as given, assume that bureaucrats can pocket the bribes charged,
and focus on bureaucrats’ optimal choice of such bribes.
The time costs can be broadly categorized as either one of the following two types:
those that bureaucrats directly control and can aﬀect, such as waiting times in lines
and processing times of applications within the oﬃce, and those that bureaucrats can-
not directly control, such as the time that individuals spend in transporting themselves
between diﬀerent oﬃces of the bureaucracy.
Paying a bribe to a bureaucrat to speed up the handling of the procedure, is a typical
example of the ﬁrst category. In a Brazilian survey of entrepreneurs’ costs and experiences
to register a ﬁrm in the garment industry, 40 percent of ﬁrms aﬃrm that ”speeding up”
the registration procedure is possible (Zylbersztajn et al. [48]). In a related paper,
Zylbersztajn and Gra¸ ca ﬁnd evidence of ﬁrms’ ”exposure to bribes solicited to accelerate
the process” [49, p. 14]. Gancheva [18] discusses similar practices at ﬁrm start-up in
Bulgaria. Queuing times inside the oﬃce is another time cost that bureaucrats can aﬀect,
by accepting bribes to let individuals jump lines. Even when paying for such ”services”,
the license applicant typically has to complete the same steps as a regular applicant.
What the intermediary function does however, is to also reduce costs that bureaucrats
cannot directly control, and further shorten the time individuals spend in licensing and
to eliminate steps that the individual has to undertake. This may include handing in-
and picking up the application at the diﬀerent oﬃces of the bureaucracy, undertake the
necessary payments, assisting when the applicant ﬁlls in application forms, take care of
paperwork that needs to be done, and deliver the completed license/certiﬁcate to the
applicant. The applicant saves on transportation costs, both the monetary cost and the
1In section 2, we document evidence on the prevalence of bureaucracy intermediaries in diﬀerent parts
of the world. Both individuals and ﬁrms use such intermediaries. The speciﬁc model in this paper is
one of individuals’ demand for intermediaries, a demand derived from time saving aspects. However, the
model can be broadly interpreted to concern also ﬁrm demand for intermediaries.
2de Soto [14] reported that starting a ﬁrm in Peru involved 11 diﬀerent steps at 7 diﬀerent government
authorities. The procedure to obtain legal authorization to build a house on state-owned land involved
15 diﬀerent steps at 6 diﬀerent authorities, which in turn consisted of a total of 207 sub-steps at approx-
imately 50 (sub-) oﬃces/counters/desks. As reported in de Soto [15], the formalization of property, or
similar procedures, involved 168 steps in the Philippines, 77 in Egypt and 111 in Haiti. Since the writings
of de Soto, the Doing Business project at the World Bank has documented procedures for starting ﬁrms,
registering property, getting credit etc., in a large number of countries. For the very same procedure,
the number of government oﬃces that has to be visited, the time delays involved and the costs tend to
be signiﬁcantly higher in the developing world, compared to developed countries (Djankov et al. [16],
World Bank [46]).
3time involved, and also economizes on time spent to ﬁnd out exactly how the procedure
works.3,4
We introduce, in section 3, a model in which bureaucrats can reduce individuals’
time costs at the bureaucracy, in exchange for bribes. A parameter α will represent the
fraction of individuals’ time costs that bureaucrats are able to remove. We then think
of a low α as representing the situation when ”only” the service of faster processing
times and/or less queuing can be provided, whereas a high α reﬂects the existence of
intermediaries, oﬀering the kind of additional services discussed above. We ﬁrst use the
model to study the eﬀect on individuals’ gain from licensing when bureaucrats set bribes
in order to maximize bribe revenue, for an exogenously speciﬁed bureaucratic procedure.
Many authors, e.g. de Soto [14], Rosenn [37], Tanzi [42], La Porta et al. [28],
have hypothesized that bureaucrats deliberately create extra bureaucratic hurdles, or red
tape, in order to extract bribes and, in addition, some have argued that such proceeds
are channeled through intermediaries (Bertrand et al. [5]). As expressed by Rosenn,
citing a typical Brazilian complaint regarding civil servants and the need to go through
time consuming red tape; ”ˆ eles criam diﬁculdades para vender facilidades (they create
diﬃculties in order to sell facilities)” (Rosenn [37, p. 535]). In actual license procedures,
we often observe that a multitude of oﬃces have to be visited, documents should be
stamped and certiﬁed, individuals have to visit the same bureaucrat several times as the
procedure progresses, etc.
Inspired by such evidence, we then let bureaucrats choose not only the level of the
bribe but also the length/complexity n of the bureaucratic procedure. We thus have in
3In this paper, corruption thus means ”speed money”. An individual can bribe a corrupt bureaucrat
to avoid some time costs, or use an intermediary (that in turn pays corrupt bureaucrats), which avoids a
larger fraction of time costs. Importantly, the bureaucrat always does his job however, in terms of making
sure that individuals fulﬁll the necessary regulation. This is similar to what was termed ”corruption
without theft” by Shleifer and Vishny [38]. We do not consider the case where corrupt bureaucrats
and/or intermediaries allow undeserving individuals to obtain licenses or permits. In addition, it is also
important to distinguish ”speed money” from ”extortion”. Extortion refers to the case when bureaucrats
charge for doing their job at all. An individual has to pay an illegal fee in order to get a document that
he/she is legally entitled to. Diﬀerently, in the case of ”speed money”, the option to stand in line the
regular way still exists and the individual thus has the choice to not bribe. This distinction, important
for the model in this paper, thus diﬀerentiates ”speed money” from ”corruption without theft”. The
distinction between the two gets blurred however when there is ”endogenous red tape”, i.e. when
corrupt bureaucrats have the choice of working slowly - thereby aﬀecting individuals’ incentive to pay
speed money, as in Lui [32], or aﬀect the length/complexity of the bureaucratic procedure, as will be the
case here.
4With its focus on speed money and endogenous red tape, the approach in this paper is diﬀerent
from many recent papers in the corruption literature. In this literature, a typical question is how the
existence of corruption - which arises from a principal/agent relationship - aﬀects the allocation of
(scarce) government beneﬁts/licenses/permits, and where the social beneﬁt of allocating the permit to
some (deserving) individuals is higher than allocating it to other (undeserving) individuals. In such
settings, corruption means accepting bribes to let undeserving/unqualiﬁed individuals obtain beneﬁts.
Banerjee et al. [3] provide a framework for studying the eﬀects of corruption and the emergence of red
tape in such settings. Additional references are also provided in this paper. Bertrand et al. [5] document
that in Delhi, India, using an intermediary/agent is the way to get a driver’s license without actually
learning how to drive. The result from this type of corruption is individuals with driver’s licenses but
without proper driving skills. It involves a social cost which is not present in, and not the purpose of,
the analysis in this paper. Here, all applicants are ”deserving”. The cost involved in the allocation of
licenses is instead time costs at the bureaucracy.
4mind corrupt bureaucrats that either have discretion over the actual implementation of
the licensing procedure, or that lobby against legislators in order to inﬂuence n, or that
channel some corruption proceeds to supervisors that have power over the implementation
of the licensing procedure. In doing this analysis, we assume ”centralized corruption”
(Shleifer and Vishny [38]). All corrupt bureaucrats take one joint decision on bribe levels
(and n). We study how the rent maximization problem, the ”optimal” complexity of
the procedure, and, importantly, individuals’ gain from licensing, depends on α.O u r
results, with a corrupt bureaucracy that optimizes the length of the license procedure
to maximize bribe revenue, echoes those of Lui [32], who analyzed endogenous red tape
with bureaucratic corruption (without intermediaries). The important additional insight
from our analysis of endogenous red tape is that, with intermediaries, procedures are
unambiguously longer and individuals are unambiguously worse oﬀ, as compared to a
model with ”direct” bribing only.5
The simple model of section 3, in which the intermediary function can be thought
of as being an extension of the bureaucrat (think of a vertically integrated bureaucrat-
intermediary entity), provides the main intuition for results that hold also in a more
general setting. In section 4, an intermediary sector is formally modeled. Because we
study endogenous intermediary entry and emergence of the sector itself, the paper pro-
vides new insights into when such services can be expected to exist.6
Before proceeding with the formal analysis however, and to better understand bu-
reaucrats’ incentives to create red tape, we need to discuss the bureaucrat-intermediary
interaction and why bureaucrats are able to capture all or some of the rents of intermedi-
aries. An intermediary handles applications at the government bureaucracy, representing
5Lui [32] analyzes the ”Myrdal hypothesis”, i.e. if corrupt bureaucrats have an incentive to slow down
service. In Lui’s model, the bureaucrat awards a license in a one-step procedure. The bureaucrat chooses
as p e e do fs e r v i c e ,i . e .h o wf a s th ew o r k sw i t he a c ha p p l i c a t i o n ,t h a ti sn e i t h e rt o of a s t-w h i c hw o u l d
leave individuals in the queue with too much surplus even if they have a cost of waiting, nor too slow
-w h i c hw o u l dm a k ei n d i v i d u a l sc h o o s et on o tq u e u e( a n db r i b e )a ta l l . I nt h i sp a p e r ,b u r e a u c r a t sd o
not choose a speed of service but can instead aﬀect the length of the procedure. Interestingly, in ”Asian
drama”, Myrdal [33] not only hypothesizes about the speed of bureaucratic service but also documents
the existence of intermediaries.
6There are a few papers on bureaucracy intermediaries, somewhat related to this paper. Hasker and
Okten [20] analyze the impact from intermediaries on the degree of socially beneﬁcial regulation that is
de facto followed, when some bureaucrats accept bribes to reduce regulation for individuals. Similarly,
Bose and Gangopadhyay [7] analyze the eﬀects of intermediaries on the amount of undeserving applicants
that obtain licenses. In these models, the intermediary has an informational advantage over individuals,
in that he knows which bureaucrats are willing to bend the rules (or accept undeserving individuals).
This provides a clear rationale for individuals to use intermediaries. In models with intermediaries
having such an informational advantage, increased enforcement of corruption in the regular bureaucracy,
higher penalties for individuals that bribe bureaucrats, as well as increased uncertainty as to which are
the corrupt bureaucrats, will typically act as an incentive to use intermediaries instead. Indeed, Hasker
and Okten [20] ﬁnd that traditional means of combating corruption are less eﬀective, and can even be
counterproductive, when there are intermediaries. Bose and Gangopadhyay [7] ﬁnd, unsurprisingly, that
the amount of undeserving applicants increases when there are intermediaries. In addition, in their
model with endogenous queue lengths at counters, under certain conditions, not only undeserving but
also deserving individuals will ﬁnd the service of an intermediary useful, in locating corrupt (honest)
bureaucrats. Both papers provide a theoretical framework for the role of intermediaries observed in the
Indian drivers’ license context by Bertrand et al. [5]. The present paper resembles these papers in that
it contains the same three ”actors”, i.e. individuals, bureaucrats and intermediaries, but the type of
corruption and the rationale for using the intermediary is diﬀerent.
5license applicants and acting on their behalf. It typically handles several applications
from diﬀerent applicants at the same time. These two features make the intermediary
easily identiﬁable as an intermediary proper. Think of an intermediary that represents
individuals applying for personal documents or entrepreneurs registering their business,
where the intermediary will carry the IDs and other documents of the applicants, at the
bureaucracy. If it is at the discretion of the bureaucrat to decide whether and how to
handle intermediaries’ applications, this means that the bureaucrat possesses bargaining
power vis-a-vis the intermediary and can capture part of the surplus associated with
the intermediation activity. As the intermediation activity is typically informal, neither
illegal nor strictly regulated, bureaucrats will have some discretion in their transactions
with intermediaries. Even if the intermediary function were completely legal and for-
malized, which is not the standard case, there would be some scope for bureaucrats to
decide how many intermediary applications to accept, and how promptly to go about in
handling them.7
An example of bureaucrat-intermediary interaction is from Brazil in general, and
the department of transport (DETRAN) in the state of S˜ ao Paulo in particular. At
these oﬃces, ”despachantes” (bureaucracy intermediaries) typically resolve the vehicle-
related errands for a number of individuals at the same time, representing each one of
them in their interaction with the authority. There is abundant anecdotal evidence that
such despachantes typically do not stand in lines, about the hand-over of ”gifts” from
despachantes to bureaucrats, but also that there are systems in place that make it possible
for despachantes to achieve time saving not available to individuals. More speciﬁcally,
despachantes have access to some of the information systems and computerized registries
of the bureaucracy. One implication is that where an individual would have to undertake
one extra step, e.g. go to an oﬃce of the bureaucracy to get an excerpt from a register,
the despachante can handle the same step from its oﬃce without going physically to the
bureaucracy. With such access, which is the result of a very close cooperation between the
bureaucracy and despachantes, these intermediaries possess a true time-saving device.
Overall, there is evidence, also from other countries than Brazil, that intermediaries
work in close collaboration with bureaucrats or that intermediaries are even former bu-
reaucrats. Fjeldstad [17] presents evidence that a crack-down on corruption at the tax
authority in Tanzania had the eﬀect that ﬁred bureaucrats instead started working as
intermediaries, using their previous corruption networks. In Russia, Ankarcrona [1] re-
ports that ”customs brokers” are typically former customs employees. Bertrand et al. [6]
ﬁnd evidence that ”agents” that help individuals to get a driver’s license in India work
in collaboration with bureaucrats to circumvent regulation.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents stylized facts about bureaucracy
intermediaries. Section 3 introduces a model of time saving and ”speed money” in license
procedures and in section 4 the model is augmented to explicitly include the intermediary
sector. Section 5 discusses results. Proofs to section 4 are in the appendix.
7As a theoretical case one could imagine a law stipulating that intermediaries are completely legal
and can represent individuals at the bureaucracy, no upper limit on the number of applications that
can he brought to the bureaucracy and intermediaries having very low-paid ”oﬃce boys” standing in
lines. This would make it diﬃcult for bureaucrats to capture any of the surplus associated with the
intermediation activity. It is interesting to note that the Brazilian bureaucracy reform ”PoupaTempo”,
discussed in section 5, not only prohibits intermediaries but also makes it necessary for applicants to get
an e wa p p o i n t m e n tn u m b e rf o re a c hn e we r r a n d[ 3 5 ] .
62. Stylized facts about bureaucracy intermediaries
This section presents stylized facts and additional evidence about bureaucracy inter-
mediaries in diﬀerent parts of the world and provides a further rationale for the model
to be presented.
Diﬀerent types of intermediaries assisting with bureaucratic contacts are common
throughout the developing world. Myrdal [33] documents their existence in India and
Oldenburg [34] goes further with a more formal account of the role of intermediaries in
a land consolidation program in Uttar Pradesh. Oldenburg identiﬁes diﬀerent roles of
intermediaries within and outside the bureaucracy and details the functions of ”brokers”,
”touts”, ”scribes”, ”consolidators”, ”helpers” and ”barkers” within the land consolida-
tion program. Levine [29] documents the existence of intermediaries in the interface
between the Ghanaian bureaucracy and ﬁrms and individuals.
The prevalence of despachantes, used in bureaucratic contacts in Brazil, is doc-
umented by Rosenn [37] and, from a sociological and anthropological viewpoint, by
DaMatta [12, 13]. Lawyer and legal thriller author John Grisham describes the Brazilian
despachante as a ”facilitator extraordinaire” that ”is an integral part of Brazilian life”
[19, p. 376]. In a comprehensive study entitled ”Brazil is not for amateurs”, Castor
describes the despachante (or ”dispatcher”) as ”a popular mediator of the relationships
between the population and the state” [8, p. 79]. When studying the formalization of
ﬁrms, Stone et al. [40], Zylbersztajn and Gra¸ ca [48] and Zylbersztajn et al. [49] provide
evidence that using intermediaries is the most common way to formalize a ﬁrm in Brazil.
Husted [21] describes how ”coyotes” help individuals obtain drivers’ licenses in Mexico.
Such coyotes are an example of ”tramitadores”, a more general and widely used term for
(mostly) informal intermediaries present in most of (Spanish-speaking) Latin America,
assisting individuals and ﬁrms with bureaucratic procedures (”tramites”). Pro´ etica [36]
documents, for Peru, the degree of individuals’ usage of tramitadores in diﬀerent bureau-
cratic contacts. Lambsdorﬀ [27] refers to tramitadores helping out with the bureaucracy
in El Salvador. Examples of reports documenting the use of such intermediaries by ﬁrms,
at formalization are CIET [10, 11] and IFC [23] for Bolivia, CIEN [9] for Guatemala,
IFC [24] for Honduras and IFC [22] for Peru.8 Gancheva [18] and Yakovlev and Zhu-
ravskaya [47] document the use of similar intermediaries by ﬁrms in Bulgaria and Russia,
respectively.
Although none of the papers above, with the possible exception of Oldenburg [34],
is a speciﬁc study of intermediaries, they point at the diﬀerent functions performed. In
some settings, the main reason why individuals use bureaucracy intermediaries seems
to be the intermediary’s knowledge of how bureaucratic procedures actually work. In
many countries with large and non-transparent bureaucracies, actually ﬁnding out what
is required in order to get, say, a passport, is a challenge in itself. Rosenn writes: ”The
despachante functions eﬀectively because he knows how to ﬁll out the bewildering vari-
ety of forms, to whom the copies should be delivered, and what documentation will be
required” [37, p. 537]. Honduran ﬁrms claim that they use tramitadores, when becoming
formal, because of lack of uniﬁed information from the authorities regarding the for-
malization procedure (IFC [24]). The same holds in a small sample of microenterprises
8Another generic name, much in use in some parts of (Spanish-speaking) Latin America, for the type
of intermediary in mind, is ”gestor”.
7in Guatemala (CIEN [9]). For Bulgarian ﬁrms obtaining an operations permit, ”the
procedures are not clear, nor are they easily accessible to potential licenses applicants”
(Gancheva [18, p. 22]).
Time-saving in bureaucratic procedures is a related reason why individuals and ﬁrms
use intermediaries. Data from the World Bank Enterprise surveys on senior management
time spent in dealing with requirements of government regulation conﬁrm that the time
spent with regulation varies a great deal between diﬀerent parts of the world. Whereas
the high-income OECD average is 4.2% of a work week, the world average is 9.8% and the
Latin American/Caribbean average is 12.7% [45]. A 1996 World Bank report studying
only a few countries showed similar values for the Latin American countries [44]. The
numbers conﬁrm earlier work by de Soto [14].
By frequent interactions, bureaucracy intermediaries learn how to handle the pro-
cedures at the government oﬃces and can solve the bureaucratic matters faster than a
particular individual or ﬁrm. The processing of many applications at the same time and
having personal relations with bureaucrats are additional reasons why these intermedi-
aries possess a ”superior technology”. As a result, the intermediary’s cost for acquiring
licenses are lower. Furthermore, Stone et al. [40] and Zylbersztajn and Gra¸ ca [49] in-
dicate that ﬁrms use intermediaries to become formal because these act much like ”one
stop shops”. The time-saving achieved by using intermediaries thus consists of two parts:
for intermediaries at the bureaucracy itself and for ﬁrms by eliminating the need to visit
multiple oﬃces. These two time-saving components are made explicit in the model in
this paper.9
3. A model of time-saving, bribes and endogenous red tape in licensing
Consider a government license that brings a beneﬁt of the value g to any individual.
Acquiring the license means going through a bureaucratic procedure consisting of n
identical steps. Each step of the procedure consists of one visit to the government
bureaucracy, where the individual interacts with a bureaucrat who is a monopolist in
this step. The individual pays the oﬃcial fee and then proceeds to the next step of the
procedure. The bureaucracy’s cost of completing the procedure for an individual consists
of two parts. The ﬁrst part is the cost that the bureaucracy faces in undertaking the
controls associated with awarding the license, for instance checking relevant criminal and
tax records, etc. This cost is constant throughout the paper. We can think of it as
deducted from individuals’ license gain, such that g represents the gain of the license
after socially relevant controls have been undertaken. The second cost, p per step of the
procedure, is the bureaucracy’s administrative cost of handling each application at each
oﬃce. The monetary cost of the license is thus np, which is also the oﬃcial license fee.
9From the supply side, one possible argument for the existence of bureaucracy intermediaries is
that the government allows them to exist as a means of helping individuals and ﬁrms going through
bureaucratic procedures. Bureaucracy intermediaries then become a ”second best” option in societies
where the government can do little to reform its bureaucracy. Another supply-side argument explaining
their existence may be that intermediaries are easier to work with for bureaucrats because they ”always
have their papers in order”. That is, the cost for handling applications from intermediaries is lower.
Bureaucrats would then be able to serve more customers of the bureaucracy in less time, which would
be socially beneﬁcial.
8Each step of the procedure is also associated with a time cost. Individuals, indexed by
i,d i ﬀer in their opportunity cost of time, Ai, which we will also refer to as ”productivity”.
Let Ai be uniformly distributed on the unit interval, (0 ≤ Ai ≤ 1), and let the total
measure of individuals be 1. Total license costs to individuals are np + nAi, and the
net gain of acquiring the license through the oﬃcial procedure is g − (np + nAi). If the
regular bureaucracy were the only means to acquire the license, all individuals would
acquire it as long as the gain for the individual with Ai = 1 is positive (i.e. for n ≤
g
p+1).
Demand would then fall as n grows, and equal zero at nmax =
g
p, which is the maximum
size of bureaucracy of interest in the model.
Now assume, as discussed above, that individuals can also acquire the license by
bribing. For each of the steps the individual pays a bribe (instead of p), whereby time
costs are reduced by a fraction α,w i t h0< α < 1. The gain that individuals can realize
from bribing is thus proportional to α. We assume that bureaucrats can not price dis-
criminate between individuals with diﬀerent opportunity costs of time. This is a central
assumption, which is maintained throughout the paper. As stated above, we also use
the assumption of centralized corruption (Shleifer and Vishny [38]). Corrupt bureaucrats
take one joint decision on the total bribe level and then split the revenue equally between
them. If the total bribe paid is B, the net gain that individuals derive from the license
becomes g − (B +( 1− α)nAi).
3.1. Individuals’ choice of how to get the license
From the expressions derived above, bribing will imply a higher net gain than going
through the regular procedure if the following condition is satisﬁed:




Individuals with productivity above this threshold level thus prefer bribing. Another
threshold will also become relevant if n is large. The oﬃcial procedure then becomes
prohibitively costly to go through, and more so for high-productivity individuals. The
relevant choice for such individuals is instead between bribing and not getting the license
at all, i.e. to get the license if the net gain is positive:




Only individuals below this productivity level will choose to get the license at all.
This latter condition on Ai will thus bind if it is less than 1, the highest productivity
level. With Ai uniformly distributed, we can write the total demand for the license,





3.2. Bureaucrats’ choice of the bribe level











9As indicated above, the solution to the problem depends on the length of the proce-
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We will refer to these cases as small-n,m i d d l e - n and large-n, respectively, and the
corresponding proﬁt levels πs, πm and πl.
For small values of n, the optimal bribe is such that individuals with productivity
levels above Ai =1 /2 choose to get the license through bribing (plug in np + αn
2 in
the threshold in 1). Individuals with lower productivity get the license from the regular
bureaucracy. The mark-up over costs np that bureaucrats charge, i.e. αn
2 , is proportional
to individuals’ gain from bribing. In the middle-range, the optimal bribe is such that the
highest-productivity individual (Ai = 1) is indiﬀerent between bribing and not getting the
license at all, which means that the optimal bribe level will decrease as n increases. This
implies that also individuals with productivity below Ai =1 /2 will bribe. For even larger
n, bribes will again increase with n and the mark-up is proportional to g−np, the gain of
the license minus costs that bureaucrats always incur. The high-productivity individuals
can no longer aﬀord the license and the low-productivity individuals increasingly switch
to bribing as the regular bureaucracy becomes prohibitively expensive. Both the lower-
and upper threshold converge to zero as n approaches nmax =
g
p, a bureaucracy size at
which no individual can aﬀord the license.
3.3. License allocations and individuals’ gain
In ﬁgure 1 the license allocation in the case of bribing (solid lines) is compared to
the benchmark case when only the option of the regular bureaucracy exists (dot-dashed
line). The graph displays (the upper solid line) the amount of licenses awarded for each
size of the bureaucratic procedure, and through which means it was awarded. For the
analysis to follow, deﬁne as G the aggregate net gain that individuals obtain from the
license, i.e. the sum of net gains from licenses awarded through the regular bureaucracy
and from bribing:





In these integrals, the integration limits will depend on n. It is clear from ﬁgure 1
that the amount of licenses awarded is greater when the option to bribe exists. As some
individuals choose to bribe, and given that they always have the option to acquire the
license from the regular bureaucracy, the aggregate gain G must be larger in the bribing
case. This is formalized in proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The aggregate net license gain G is higher when the possibility to bribe
exists, than if the license can only be acquired through the regular bureaucracy. No indi-
vidual is worse oﬀ and some individuals are strictly better oﬀ. This holds irrespective of
parameter values.
10All individuals that bribe, and there will be some such individuals due to bureaucrats’
proﬁt maximization, will be better oﬀ than they were when the option to bribe did not
exist. In addition, the higher productivity an individual has, the larger is the gain from
bribing compared to going through the regular bureaucracy (because bureaucrats cannot
price discriminate). Proposition 1 thus states that corruption is good: the possibility to
pay ”speed money” means that (some) individuals can get the license at a lower total
cost. It is a formalization of the ”grease the wheels” view of corruption, see e.g. Bardhan
[4] and Svensson [41] for a discussion and early references.
In section 1, we motivated that low values of the parameter α can be interpreted as
representing the case in which bureaucrats can remove some - but not all - of the time
costs that individuals face, and that a higher α represents the case with intermediaries.
We can think of a high α as representing a vertically integrated corrupt bureaucracy and
intermediary entity that takes one joint bribe setting decision and where there are no
additional costs associated with intermediation. Intuitively, individuals should have a
higher net gain G the higher is α, as they get a fraction of the surplus associated with
reducing time costs. As stated in the following proposition this is indeed the case, expect
in the middle n-range.
Proposition 2. The aggregate net license gain G increases with the fraction α of time








2−α , i.e. ∂G
∂α > 0. For intermediate bureaucracy sizes, ∂G
∂α < 0.
For both small and large n, bureaucrats’ optimal bribes will be such that a constant
fraction of the surplus associated with time saving can be captured. This is because
bureaucrats cannot price discriminate. An increase in α implies a higher surplus to
be divided between bureaucrats and individuals, we thus have ∂G
∂α > 0. In the middle-n
region, the individual with Ai = 1 will get an additional time saving of (∆α)nAi =( ∆α)n
as α increases, the bribe is increased accordingly, and bribing individuals with Ai < 1
are therefore worse oﬀ. In what follows, we return to the α-dependence in detail.
3.4. Endogenous red tape and individuals’ gain from licensing
Thus far, we have considered the problem that bureaucrats face when maximizing
revenue from ”speed money”, given a license procedure. That is, the implementation
of the license procedure, i.e. the exact number of checks and controls, documents to be
ﬁlled in, stamps to be obtained etc., represented by n, has been exogenously determined.
However, if the corrupt bureaucrats can aﬀect the way in which the license procedure
is implemented, the analysis changes signiﬁcantly. In actual license procedures, it is not
uncommon that the same bureaucrat has to be visited several times, that application
documents have to be certiﬁed/authenticated several times, that the individual herself
has to deliver and pick up papers at an oﬃce on diﬀerent days and times with varying
opening hours, and so on (de Soto [14], Rosenn [37]). As motivated in the introduction,
we take the view that corrupt bureaucrats, while still obeying all rules and performing
all relevant checks related to awarding the licenses, are free to choose how the procedure
is implemented. That is, bureaucrats choose the number of steps n of the procedure.
In making this choice, the administrative costs of handling applications, i.e. np, are
incurred.
11Figure 2 shows bureaucrats’ proﬁts π (solid, inverted U) and individuals’ gain G
(dot-dashed) from the optimal solution in (4). The sum of π, G and aggregate time costs
incurred by individuals is also shown (upper solid curve). As long as all individuals get
the license, these three terms must sum to g −np. The ﬁgure suggests that bureaucrats’
proﬁts are maximized in the middle-n region (indicated between the two adjacent markers
on the horizontal axis). To show this formally we solve the proﬁt maximization problem











The problem has a solution only when 1 =
g−B
(1−α)n, as proﬁts are strictly increasing
or decreasing in n, for small- and large n,r e s p e c t i v e l y . 10 The solution is
B∗ = g − (1 − α)n∗,n ∗ =
g
￿
(1 + p)(1 + p − α)
(6)
The ﬁrst thing to note about the solution is that not only optimal bureaucracy prof-
its π∗ (obtained by plugging in 6 in 5), but also the optimal length of the bureaucratic
procedure, n∗, is increasing in α. This is because bribing individuals can realize higher
gains from the license as α increases, which in turn allows bureaucrats to increase the
length of the license procedure and thereby the surplus related to time saving that can
be extracted from individuals. Thus when bureaucrats/intermediaries can provide larger
reductions in time costs for individuals, it is optimal to make procedures longer. Second,
by plugging in (B∗,n ∗), and the corresponding threshold between the regular bureau-
cratic procedure and bribing, in the expression for G in deﬁnition 1, one can show that
the aggregate individual gain at the ”optimal” procedure length is decreasing in α.W e
summarize these results below:
Proposition 3. Bureaucracy proﬁts π∗, and the length of the bureaucratic procedure
that maximizes bureaucrats’ bribe proﬁts, n∗, increase in the fraction α of time costs that
can be removed by the bureaucrat/intermediary. At n∗, individuals’ aggregate gain G(n∗)




Proof, aggregate gain at n∗. For individuals that do not bribe, it is clear that the increase
in n makes them worse oﬀ. Consider now individuals that bribe. As both α and n∗
increase, the eﬀect on a briber’s gain is a priori unclear. Study the small-n solution
from (4), i.e. up to n = n∗
1, which is the procedure length at which the Ai = 1-
individual is indiﬀerent between bribing and ”informality”.11 The bribe is np + α
2,w i t h
gain g − np − nα
2 − (1 − α)nAi. Consider an increase in α, and a subsequent increase in
n, that leaves an individual indiﬀerent (for simplicity assume p = 0). Equaling the total
diﬀerential of the gain w.r.t. (α,n) to zero, gives
10The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to B are unchanged from the problem in (3), which implies
that we can ﬁrst solve the problem with respect to B,w h i c hw a sd o n ei n( 4 ) ,t h e nw i t hr e s p e c tt on.
This amounts to maximizing the proﬁts implied by (4) with respect to n.
11We know from proposition 2 that ∂G
∂α < 0i nt h em i d d l e - n region, so if G(n∗
1)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nα,t h i s
is enough to establish the proposition.
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(n∆α + α∆n)=Ai(n∆α − (1 − α)∆n) (7)
The LHS is the increase in the bribe when α and n increase. It reﬂects that bureau-
crats cannot price discriminate: all individuals face the same bribe increase. The RHS
is the net reduction in time costs at the bureaucracy when α and n increase. It shows
that individuals with higher Ai get a larger reduction in time costs (for constant ∆n).
As a result, and in order to get equality in (7), the larger is Ai, the larger is the ∆n
required to make the individual indiﬀerent. But at n∗
1 it is exactly the Ai = 1-individual
that is indiﬀerent between bribing and ”informality”. The increase in α thus results in
an increase in n∗
1, such that the Ai = 1- individual is again indiﬀerent. Other bribing
individuals will therefore be worse oﬀ, as the increase ∆n is ”too large”. This establishes
∂G(n
∗)
∂α < 0, and hence follows from the lack of price discrimination. Note that p>0
exacerbates the eﬀect.
We have thus established that the more time saving that can be oﬀered - with more
time saving being possible when there are bureaucracy intermediaries - the stronger are
bureaucrats’ incentives to create red tape, and the worse oﬀ are individuals. This is a
general result, and holds in a variety of settings: when some but not all bureaucrats
are corrupt, when comparing a model with a bribe option only, to a model with both a
bribe- and an intermediary option, as is shown in section 4; and for diﬀerent degrees of
competition in the intermediary sector.
Proposition 3 predicts that countries that have a sector of bureaucracy intermedi-
aries should have longer bureaucratic procedures for getting licenses. Due to lack of data
on the prevalence of bureaucracy intermediaries in diﬀerent countries, this prediction is
diﬃcult to test. However, the model presents one channel, out of many possible, that
can potentially explain the high correlations observed between corruption and the size of
bureaucracy. The correlation between the country rankings of ”Ease of Doing Business”,
which is a measure of bureaucratic complexity, from the World Bank, and the ”Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index”, from Transparency International, is around 0.8. Although
these indices are, at best, proxies for variables in our model (n and π,r e s p e c t i v e l y ) ,t h e
following potential channel to create such a correlation is suggested here: Bureaucrats
seek to maximize revenue from bribes =⇒ Bureaucrats seek to be able to reduce time
costs at the bureaucracy more eﬀectively (i.e. to increase α), which is facilitated by the
presence of intermediaries =⇒ The more eﬀective the intermediary sector is in reducing
time costs at the bureaucracy, the stronger the incentive for bureaucrats to complicate
=⇒ The length of procedures, n, and corruption proﬁts, π, increase.12
Admittedly, this argument is silent about why corruption occurs in the ﬁrst place,
and about the details of the intermediary sector. The next section, by endogenizing
12It should also be noted here that both large bureaucracies and the extent of corruption are highly
(negatively) correlated with country income: the correlation coeﬃcients between either of the two in-
dices above, with GDP/capita, is around 0.75 in absolute value. These facts underline the development
aspect of addressing issues related to bureaucracy and corruption. The data sources are World Bank
[46], Transparency International [43] and IMF [26]. There are 172 countries with Doing Business, Cor-
ruption and GDP/capita data, which were used to calculate the correlation coeﬃcients. The Corruption
Perceptions Index, which runs from 1 to 10, was converted into a simple ranking of countries, with the
least corrupt country ranked ﬁrst. For GDP/capita, countries were ranked from low to high income.
13the emergence and size of the sector itself, addresses the second of these shortcomings.
Before presenting the augmented model, however, the following citation from Castor [8]
illustrates the mechanisms studied in this paper. The author discusses various waves
of Brazilian bureaucracy reforms, from the 1930’s until the 1990’s, the citation concerns
the reform eﬀorts by the head of the ”Extraordinary Ministry for De-Bureaucratization”,
Helio Beltr˜ ao, in the early 1980’s (pp. 171-172):
Beltr˜ ao’s approach was basically to concentrate the eﬀorts of his team
on the simpliﬁcation of the day-to-day life of the population and of business
through the elimination of hundreds of unnecessary or redundant documents
in bidding procedures, the ﬁnancing and mortgaging of houses, the issuance
of personal documents such as driver licenses, and similar everyday trans-
actions. Even if some of the ”simpliﬁcations” of Beltr˜ ao survived and were
incorporated in the administrative praxis, a large number of his innovations
were quietly eliminated by the actions of bureaucrats who had lost their power
to complicate others’ lives. They were helped by groups of professionals like
”dispatchers” and public notaries who had lost a substantial part of their
business due to the reduction in requirements for documentation, signatures
and stamps.
4. Bureaucracy intermediaries
In this section, we explicitly model both a bribe- and an intermediary option, as
two diﬀerent alternatives for individuals to obtain time cost reductions when getting the
license. Instead of assuming a vertically-integrated bureaucracy/intermediary entity we
thus model a separate intermediary sector, along with a corrupt bureaucracy. Bureau-
crats now set two bribe levels; to individuals and to intermediaries. We refer to this
model as the ”bribe and intermediary model”. We also include in the analysis the case
where bureaucrats choose to only accept bribes indirectly, i.e. through intermediaries.
This is referred to as the ”intermediary only model”.13
Whether intermediaries exist or not, depends, among other factors, on individuals’
demand for licenses, on how complicated license procedures are and on costs to become
an intermediary. This suggests that the existence of the sector itself, entry into the
sector, its size and degree of competition, and the eﬀects on license allocations should be
endogenously determined within the model. In addition, when bureaucrats can choose
the length of the procedure n, changes in n will have an impact on the intermediary
sector, in turn aﬀecting bureaucrats’ choice of procedure length.
In our model an intermediary, as motivated in section 2, is a ”one stop shop”, at
which individuals can obtain the same license as can be acquired either through the
regular procedure, or through bribing. We make the assumption that using an inter-
mediary eliminates all bureaucracy-related time costs for individuals, and that there are
13Ap r i o r iw es h o u l de x p e c tt h em o d e lw i t hi n t e r m e d i a r i e so n l yt og e n e r a t el o w e rb u r e a u c r a c yp r o ﬁ t s ,
as bureaucrats only use one of two available instruments. It turns out to be true that bureaucrats resort
to the intermediary only option for a limited parameter space, but we need to include it in the analysis
as the intermediary problem diﬀers somewhat when direct bribing is not possible.
14no time costs for individuals in the interaction with the intermediary.14 Individuals pay
intermediaries a fee d, and obtain the license, thus realizing a net gain of g−d.I n t e r m e -
diaries, in turn, acquire the license from the government bureaucracy by paying a bribe
Bd to bureaucrats. Apart from Bd, intermediaries have no other costs at the government
bureaucracy (in particular, no time costs). Intermediaries maximize proﬁts and cannot
price discriminate between individuals.15
We use a standard Cournot model of oligopolistic competition between identical in-
termediaries. This provides us with a setting in which the intermediary price entails a
mark-up over costs Bd, a mark-up that decreases as competition increases. The number
of intermediaries, deﬁned as m, is determined by a zero net-proﬁt entry condition.16
More speciﬁcally, the cost to enter is f per step of the license procedure, i.e. a total cost
of nf, which is also the proﬁt each intermediary will make. With this speciﬁcation, entry
costs reﬂect the fact that the longer the procedure, thus involving contacts with more
bureaucrats and oﬃces, the more costly it is for a prospective intermediary to learn.17
In section 4.1, the bribe and intermediary model is presented, and in section 4.2
we brieﬂy present the intermediary only model. In section 4.3 we determine, for each
combination of n and f, which model maximizes bureaucrats’ proﬁts (the bribe only
model- as presented in section 3, the bribe and intermediary model, or the intermedi-
ary only model).18 This determines allocations, optimal bureaucracy proﬁts, whether
intermediaries exist or not, and, in case of existence, the size of the intermediary sector.
Bureaucrats’ optimal choice when n is endogenous is then analyzed (section 4.4).
In sections 4.1 and 4.2, bureaucrats’ choice of bribe levels are subject to the constraint
that at least one intermediary should enter, i.e. total proﬁts in the intermediary sector
must be at least nf. In the bribe and intermediary model, the sequence of events is:
Bureaucrats choose two bribe levels, B and Bd, that individuals that bribe and inter-
mediaries, respectively, will pay when acquiring the license. Second, given B and Bd,a
number m ≥ 1 of intermediaries will simultaneously decide to enter and set a license fee
d, determined through Cournot competition, such that each intermediary entrant makes
zero net proﬁts. Third, individuals, taking B and d as given, choose if and through
which means to acquire the license. In the intermediary only model, bureaucrats choose
Bd, that intermediaries will pay when acquiring the license. Second, given Bd,an u m b e r
m ≥ 1 of intermediaries will simultaneously decide to enter and set a license fee d,d e -
termined through Cournot competition, such that each intermediary entrant makes zero
net proﬁts. Third, individuals, taking d as given, choose if and through which means to
acquire the license.
14In section 4, α refers to the time saving that is obtained by bribing, and the bribe only set-up
is modeled as in section 3. Using intermediaries instead implies a complete reduction in time costs.
Changes in α will therefore only change the diﬀerence between how much time that can be saved by
bribing and by using an intermediary.
15Adding a small time cost for individuals when using intermediaries, or for intermediaries at the
bureaucracy, would not change the qualitative results of the paper.
16In order to avoid analytical complications we allow m to be a continuous variable, and the interme-
diary sector exists if and only if m ≥ 1.
17Constant entry costs, as opposed to nf,a r ed i s c u s s e da tt h ee n do fs e c t i o n4 . 3 .
18Note again that the model from section 3 is thus recast as the bribe only model.
154.1. Bribe and intermediary model
4.1.1. Individuals’ choice of how to get the license
The threshold between the regular bureaucratic procedure and bribing is unchanged
from expression 1 above, i.e. individuals with productivity Ai ≥
B−np
αn prefer to bribe.
Individuals instead prefer intermediaries over bribing if




As it can never be optimal to have an intermediary fee larger than g, high-productivity
individuals will always acquire the license, irrespective of n.T h i s i s d i ﬀerent from the
model in section 3, and comes from the assumption that there are no remaining time
costs (and that we assume that individuals indiﬀerent between informality and getting
the license will acquire it). We can thus write the demand for intermediaries as Qd =
1 − d−B




4.1.2. Intermediaries’ entry decision and choice of optimal fee
Upon entry, an intermediary makes a quantity choice q, taking the quantity of the
other (m − 1) intermediaries, deﬁned as ˜ q, as given. With Qd = q +˜ q, we can solve for
the indirect demand function d(q), which is used in the proﬁt function q × (d(q) − Bd),
to get the individual intermediary’s proﬁt maximization problem:
Max
q q × ((1 − α)n + B − (1 − α)nq − (1 − α)n˜ q − Bd) (9)
Solving for q as a function of ˜ q, then applying symmetry between intermediaries, the
optimal q is plugged back into d(q) to get d(B,Bd,m)= 1
m+1((1−α)n+B)+ m
m+1(Bd).
This response function captures the standard feature of Cournot competition, i.e. a
mark-up over cost Bd that gradually declines as the number of intermediaries, m, grows.
Using this response function, and equaling per-intermediary proﬁts with entry costs nf,
we arrive at the expressions that determine m and each intermediary’s pricing rule d, as










where d(Bd)=Bd + n
￿
f(1 − α) (10)
The expression for m(B,Bd) is total intermediary sector proﬁts, divided by nf.T h e
mark-up in the intermediary sector is d(Bd) − Bd = n
￿
f(1 − α), which increases in f.
4.1.3. Bureaucrats’ choice of bribe levels
Bureaucrats choose B and Bd to maximize proﬁts derived from direct demand, QB,


















s.t. d(Bd) ≤ g, m(B,Bd) ≥ 1,B≤ (1 − α)np + αd(Bd) (11)
16The latter constraint assures that demand for bribing QB does not become negative.
The solution is given in (12).
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f1 <f≤ f2, 0 ≤ n<n ￿
d=g : d<g ,m=1
B = np + nα
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B = g − n(1 − α)+n
￿
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d=g : d<g ,m=1 ,B=( 1− α)np + αd (i.e. QB = 0)
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with Bd = d − n
￿







































There are ﬁve distinct solutions, depending on which constraints that bind, and the
cases for which d = g,m > 1 and d = g,m = 1 are repeated for presentation purposes.
The larger is n, the larger will be the intermediary fee, such that the constraint on d
will bind above a certain n-threshold. The m = 1-threshold binds, for small n, above
f = f1 = 1−α
9 , but is relaxed for larger n. The constraint of QB = 0 binds, for small n,
17above f = f2 = 1−α
4 , but is relaxed for larger n.19 For each of the three f-intervals in
(12), we refer to the solutions as either small-n (when d<g ), or large-n (when d = g
binds).
The entry cost level f2 = 1−α
4 is an important cutoﬀ level for small n. For small n,
with proﬁts linearly increasing in n, proﬁts in the bribe and intermediary model, and in
the bribe only model, are equal. This can be seen by plugging in f2 in the expressions
for Bd and d above. We get Bd = B = np + nα
2 and d = np + n
2. The individual with
Ai = 1
2 is indiﬀerent between the regular bureaucracy, bribing and using an intermediary
(hence noone bribes), and, because Bd also equals B from the small-n solution in section
3, proﬁts must be equal. Above f2, proﬁts are larger in the bribe only model.20
4.2. Intermediary only model
When bureaucrats accept bribes only through intermediaries, the problem set-up
follows the same logic as in the previous analyses.21 Choosing between the regular
bureaucracy and intermediaries, individuals prefer the latter option if




such that demand for intermediaries is 1 −
d−np
n . Using the same reasoning as in
section 4.1.2 in solving the intermediary proﬁt maximization problem, the expressions










where d(Bd)=Bd + n
￿
f (14)
Finally, bureaucrats maximize proﬁts ΠI from indirect bribes (where index I indicates
the intermediary only case) subject to the constraints on m and d, hence solving
Max
Bd






s.t. d(Bd) ≤ g, m(B,Bd) ≥ 1 (15)
19Note that for each level of f,p r o ﬁ t sw i l lb en e g a t i v ef o rn close enough to nmax =
g
p (this results
from the existence of entry costs). For large enough entry costs (f> 1−α
(2−α)2 ,w h i c hi sl a r g e rt h a n
f2 = 1−α
4 ), proﬁts will be negative also for small n.H o w e v e r ,t h es o l u t i o ni n( 1 2 )n e v e ra p p l i e sw h e n
proﬁts are close enough to zero, because proﬁts in the bribe only model are always positive. A similar
reasoning as in this footnote also applies to the solution in section 4.2.
20For small n,a n df<1−α
4 ,w eg e tQB > 0a n dd<g ,i . e .d i r e c tb r i b i n ga n du s eo fi n t e r m e d i a r i e s
coexist, and the choice of B and Bd is not constrained by the optimal intermediary fee equaling g,i t s
maximum level. As a result, the bribe level B = np + nα
2 is the same as in the bribe only model. This
stems from the fact that individuals can always choose to use the regular bureaucracy and bureaucrats
therefore face the same proﬁt trade-oﬀ with respect to changes in B in both models. (The same property
was pointed out by Hasker and Okten [20], studying the eﬀects of anti-corruption policies in a model
with intermediaries).
21One diﬀerence from 4.1 is that individuals now compare the net gain of using an intermediary, with
the regular procedure only. In the bribe and intermediary model, when the QB =0c o n s t r a i n tw a s
binding, bureaucrats still set a direct bribe B.T h i sm e a n st h a td e m a n dr e s p o n d sd i ﬀerently to changes
in d in the two models.
18The solution is below. It displays a small-n region, where d<g , and a large n-region,
much as above. The cutoﬀ level f = 1
9 is where the m = 1-constraint starts binding, for
small n.
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4.3. Bureaucracy proﬁts and existence of intermediaries
The ﬁnal step in solving the problem is to compare proﬁts from sections 4.1 and 4.2
to proﬁts in the bribe only model (section 3), which determines whether intermediaries
exist or not. Proposition 4, in which 0 <f 1 <f 2 < ¯ f<¯ ¯ f<f max for all α ∈ (0,1),
and where all f-thresholds are functions of α only, characterizes the solution to the full
problem.
Proposition 4. For f and α such that
0 ≤ f ≤ f2, 0 < α < 1, bureaucrats choose the bribe and intermediary option for small
procedure lengths (below a threshold-n), and the bribe only option for large procedure
lengths (above the threshold-n);
f2 <f≤ fmax, 0.42 ≤ α < 1,
f2 <f≤ ¯ f, 0 < α < 0.42,
¯ ¯ f<f≤ fmax , 0 < α < 0.42, bureaucrats choose the bribe and intermediary option for
intermediate procedure lengths, and the bribe only option for small- and large procedure
lengths;
¯ f<f≤ ¯ ¯ f, 0 < α < 0.42, bureaucrats choose the intermediary only option, and the bribe
and intermediary option, for a lower- and upper- intermediate range, respectively, and
the bribe only option elsewhere.
Proof. See the appendix.
Figures 3 and 4 display the solution graphically, for ”typical” parameter values, for
19which the intermediary only solution is never optimal.22 In ﬁgure 3, three sets of graphs
are shown, with a diﬀerent entry cost f for each set of graphs (and with g, p, α kept
constant). The upper panel in each set shows bureaucracy proﬁts in the bribe and
intermediary model (solid), and the lower panel shows m, the size of the intermediary
sector (panels A-F). In each proﬁt graph the proﬁts from the bribe only model is also
shown (this curve, dashed, remains the same in all three panels). In each m-graph the
proﬁt comparison is explicitly taken into account in that, for each n, bureaucrats optimal
choice will be whichever of the two settings (bribe and intermediary, or bribe only) that
delivers the highest proﬁts. Intermediaries will only exist if proﬁts in the model with
intermediaries are higher than in the bribe only case.
There are three critical threshold values for f in the model, f1, f2 and fmax, all given
in (12). For low entry costs, 0 ≤ f ≤ f1, as depicted in panels A-B, the constraint on
m never binds and the intermediary sector is large. The size of the sector is constant
for small n because increases in n, which always imply larger time saving for individuals
when bribing/using intermediaries, result in bureaucracy bribes, an intermediary fee and
bureaucracy and intermediary proﬁts that increase linearly in n. As also entry costs
increase linearly in n, the size of the intermediary sector is constant. For larger n,w h e r e
the d = g-constraint binds, the number of intermediaries increases with the length of the
bureaucratic procedure. The mark-up in the intermediary sector increases linearly in n,
but as d is constrained to equal g, the beneﬁt of using an intermediary, and consequently
demand for intermediaries, increases, which allows more intermediaries to enter (from
10).
As f increases, with f1 <f≤ f2, the constraint on m will bind for small sizes of
the bureaucratic procedure, but is relaxed for larger n (panels C-D). For small n, and
as in panels A-B, bureaucracy proﬁts are always larger with intermediaries, assuring the
existence of the sector for such license procedures. Proﬁts are lower than in panels A-B
however, the intermediary sector is smaller and does not exist for as high n.
As f increases further, with f2 <f<f max, large entry costs make the existence of
intermediaries too costly for bureaucrats for small n,i . e .s e t t i n gBd (and B) such that at
least one intermediary can enter is less proﬁtable than operating without intermediaries.
There is still a middle-range of n, however, with the bribe and intermediary solution.
As bribing only allows individuals a time saving of a fraction α, it implies that increases
in n will make bureaucracy proﬁts start decreasing at a smaller n, as compared to the
bribe and intermediary case. As f approaches fmax, the range over which there are
intermediaries shrinks to zero.
22The intermediary only option is only proﬁt-maximizing for a narrow range of entry costs, for inter-
mediate values of n,a n do n l yw h e nα is small. For small n (i.e. when d<g ), we have that whenever
the bribe and intermediary solution is unrestricted (f ≤ f1), or when (only) the m =1 - c o n d i t i o nb i n d s ,
for both models, (f1 <f≤ f2,f > 1
9), proﬁts are higher in the bribe and intermediary model. It can
also be proven that proﬁts are higher in the bribe and intermediary model when (f1 <f≤ f2,f < 1
9),
i.e. when the m =1 - c o n s t r a i n tb i n d si nt h eb r i b ea n di n t e r m e d i a r ym o d e lb u tn o ti nt h ei n t e r m e d i a r y
only model. Even though proﬁts in the intermediary only model are higher for large enough f,a tt h e s e
entry costs the bribe only proﬁts are instead higher. The only parameter range where the intermediary
only solution will give the highest proﬁts is therefore when the small-n solutions of the intermediary
only, and bribe and intermediary, models apply, but the bribe only proﬁts have passed its peak and start
declining (which happens for smaller values of n,t h es m a l l e ri sα). In the appendix, all relevant proﬁt
comparisons are made.
20Figure 4A displays the solution in (n,f) - space, for given values of α, g and p. As
depicted above the intermediary sector exists for small n as long as f is not too large,
the m = 1 - constraint binds as f becomes high enough and, given an entry cost, the
intermediary sector ceases to exist for large enough n. Furthermore, it is in the middle-
range of n that the highest entry costs in the intermediary sector can be sustained, where
individuals’ time saving and willingness to pay for bribing/intermediation is high, yet the
costs np, unavoidable for bureaucrats, are not too high. For the parameter combination
used in ﬁgure 4 it is clear that the solution where QB = 0, i.e. where B is set such that
there is no direct bribing, holds only over a very limited parameter space. Intermediaries
should thus be expected to coexist with direct bribing.23,24
A ﬁnal note in this section relates to entry costs. If such costs had been speciﬁed as
constant, rather than as a function of the complexity of the bureaucratic procedure, there
would never be intermediaries for the smallest n, as entry costs cannot be recovered by
intermediaries. For large enough n, we would get one intermediary, and then an increase
in m for increasing n, over the range that intermediaries exist. The results of the paper
with respect to endogenous license lengths and individuals’ gain from licensing would
not change with this alternative speciﬁcation.
4.4. Endogenous red tape and individuals’ gain from licensing
We now turn to bureaucrats’ optimal choice of n.25 As may be guessed from the
proﬁt graphs in ﬁgure 3, the procedure length that maximizes bureaucracy proﬁts, n∗,
is always larger in the model with bribes and intermediaries, than with bribes only.
In the bribe and intermediary model, proﬁts are always maximized in the large-n
region, in which d = g binds, and, depending on f, we can have either m>1 or m = 1.
Above a certain threshold level of f, bureaucrats prefer the bribe only solution. Panel
E of ﬁgure 3 was constructed such that proﬁts are equal in the two models, hence above
the corresponding f-value the bribe only solution is preferred. Not surprisingly, the
size of the intermediary sector will be smaller, and hence less competitive, at the proﬁt
maximum, the larger is f. In addition, the aggregate individual gain is always smaller
when the bribe and intermediary model determines bureaucrats’ optimal choice of n.26
23The papers by Hasker and Okten [20] and Bose and Gangopadhyay [7] modeled intermediaries that
help circumvent rules and regulations, rather than the time saving aspect. In such a setting there may
be additional incentives for bureaucrats to channel corruption through intermediaries, not present in our
model.
24Other values of α give a similarly small area over which QB =0b i n d s . A ni n c r e a s ei nα,w h i c h
implies that the diﬀerence in time saving between using an intermediary and bribing goes down, gives
as i m i l a r - s h a p e dc u r v ea si nﬁ g u r e4 A ,b u tc o m p r e s s e dt o w a r d sz e r o ,a ss m a l l e re n t r yc o s t sc a nn o wb e
sustained in the intermediary sector. A reduction in α gives the opposite eﬀect. For 0 ≤ α < 0.42 the
intermediary only solution is optimal over a very limited parameter space, which is the area indicated
in gray in ﬁgure 4B. The other areas of the solution are as in ﬁgure 4A. A technical detail of the model,
which adds little additional insight and therefore is placed in the appendix, is that the derivation of
the n-a n df-thresholds between which the bribe and intermediary solution (and the intermediary only
solution) apply, varies somewhat depending on the shape of the proﬁt curves, in particular for f>f 2
as in panel E-F in ﬁgure 3.
25The intermediary only solution never generates the highest proﬁts when n is endogenous (see proof
to proposition 5 below), this discussion thus concerns the comparison between the bribe only and the
bribe and intermediary models.
26Because d = g,m e a n i n gt h a ti n d i v i d u a l su s i n gi n t e r m e d i a r i e sh a v ez e r on e tg a i nf r o mt h el i c e n s e ,
we can still use deﬁnition 1 for the gain calculations (always applying the appropriate thresholds.)
21These assertions are summarized in proposition 5, in which 0 <f ∗ <f ∗∗ <f max for all
α ∈ (0,1), p ≥ 0, and illustrated in ﬁgure 5.
Proposition 5. The procedure length n∗ that maximizes bureaucrats’ proﬁts is
n∗ =

    












if f∗ ≤ f<f ∗∗
g √
(1+p)(1+p−α) if f∗∗ ≤ f<f max
In the ﬁrst two intervals, i.e. for f such that 0 ≤ f<f ∗∗, bureaucrats’ optimal choice of
n is given by the bribe and intermediary option. Bureaucracy proﬁts are strictly larger,
the bureaucratic procedure n∗ is strictly longer and individuals’ aggregate gain from the
license is strictly lower than when the bribe only option is optimal, which is the case for
f∗∗ ≤ f<f max.F o r 0 ≤ f<f ∗, increases in f result in shorter bureaucratic proce-
dures, ∂n
∗
∂f < 0, higher aggregate gain,
∂G(n
∗)
∂f > 0, and a smaller intermediary sector
∂m(n
∗)
∂f < 0;f o rf∗ ≤ f<f ∗∗ increases in f has an ambiguous eﬀect on n∗ and G(n∗),












Proof. See the appendix.
The negative derivative of n∗ with respect to f,o v e r0≤ f<f ∗, can be understood
as follows. For 0 ≤ f<f ∗, we have the large-n solution with d = g,m > 1 at the proﬁt




2 , which is decreasing in
f. As bureaucrats are bound by Bd = g − n
￿
f(1 − α), larger entry costs f will have
a direct negative eﬀect on indirect bribe proﬁts. This aﬀects the optimal choice of B
which is reduced in order to channel individuals to direct bribing instead. In making this
choice, a larger fraction of bureaucrats’ proﬁts now stem from direct bribes, which gives
individuals a time saving of α. The possibilities for bureaucrats to raise n are reduced,
as the time-saving service oﬀered is less valuable to the aggregate of individuals.
Figure 5 shows optimal bureaucracy proﬁts (panel A), the aggregate individual gain
(panel B), the optimal procedure length (panel C) and the size of the intermediary sector
(panel D), as a function of f, for constant values of g, p and α (solid lines). The dashed
line corresponds to the bribe only model. The ﬁgure shows that bureaucracy proﬁts
are higher, procedures are longer and individuals are worse oﬀ, when the bribe and
intermediary solution is optimal. In addition, for 0 ≤ f<f ∗, lower entry costs into
intermediation results in a larger intermediary sector, higher bureaucracy proﬁts, longer
procedures and less gain from licensing.
225. Discussion
This paper suggests a theory of bureaucracy intermediaries, which are common in
many developing countries. In a model where the bureaucracy intermediary sector is
endogenous and arises, if at all, from bureaucrats maximizing rents from a license proce-
dure, the paper addresses a topic with very few previous studies. A ﬁrst straightforward
result of the analysis is that if entry costs to become an intermediary are low, the inter-
mediary sector is large, competitive, and exists for both short as well as longer license
procedures. If entry costs to become an intermediary are instead high, if the intermedi-
ation activity is restricted, made more diﬃcult, or is better controlled, the intermediary
sector should then only be expected to emerge, if at all, for longer license procedures (as
opposed to the shortest ones). A second result is that, for almost all combinations of
license procedure lengths and entry costs, bureaucracy intermediaries should be expected
to coexist with direct bribing, rather than as the only option to speed up processes and
grease the wheels. Figures 3 and 4 capture these predictions of the model.
How should such entry costs to become an intermediary be interpreted, however? One
straightforward interpretation is that it is costly to learn and understand how a license
procedure works, what documents are required at each step, how to ﬁll them in, etc.
It may require legal training to understand the intricacies of procedures and diﬀerent
cases that can arise in the handling of applications. If there are diﬀerent authorities
involved in a license procedure, diﬀerent documents/certiﬁcates/stamps required at each
step, combined with many exceptions to rules, loopholes and workarounds, it seems
reasonable to assume that entry costs are a function of the complexity of procedures.
However, it is not a priori clear how such costs would diﬀer between countries with
equally long procedures, say.27
Another interpretation is that f represents some aspect of policy, perhaps rules and
regulations, at the government oﬃces, that restrict the possibilities of intermediaries to
represent individuals and ﬁrms at the bureaucracy, or more eﬀective corruption controls.
If enforcement vis-a-vis the sector is correlated with (country) income, with high-income
countries having more enforcement/regulations/restrictions, we should expect less of bu-
reaucracy intermediaries in richer countries, and if at all, only for longer procedures (as
opposed to shorter ones). The reading of the available literature that discusses bureau-
cracy intermediaries, summarized in section 2, suggests that bureaucracy intermediaries
are very common in many developing countries, and much less common in richer coun-
tries. In this paper, some evidence of the mode of operation of the sector in Latin
America, and in Brazil in particular, is presented. However, data collection and em-
pirical studies on the prevalence of intermediaries in diﬀerent countries, and for which
government authorities/license procedures/services such bureaucracy intermediaries are
most common, and how intermediaries typically operate, is needed to provide a fuller
picture.
In many parts of Latin America tramitadores are neither legal nor strictly illegal, but
their presence and ability to operate outside and inside many government oﬃces means
that there is a de facto acceptance and/or lack of enforcement towards the intermediation
27In addition, low entry costs for intermediaries, due to clear and transparent procedures, would prob-
ably also imply low costs for individuals (which in the present model could be modeled as a compression
of the Ai-distribution towards zero).
23activity. This suggests that bureaucrats and tramitadores operate in close connection,
and that bureaucrats facilitate the intermediation activity (”f is low”).
In Brazil, despachantes are recognized as a professional category, formalized training
exists, there are trade unions and despachantes have the right to formally represent cit-
izens and to operate inside some government bureaucracies. An example is the above
mentioned department of transport, DETRAN, in S˜ ao Paulo, and in other Brazilian
states. Traditionally, buying, owning and selling vehicles is something for which citizens
in Brazil face a large number of legal requirements, and, consequently, interactions with
the government bureaucracy. This is costly, money- and time-wise. However, the exis-
tence of despachantes, the recognition of such intermediaries to handle vehicle matters
at the bureaucracy, their preferential access at the authorities, and other aspects of the
bureaucracy-intermediary interaction, are there to simplify.
If we view the license procedure as exogenous, such intermediaries and supporting
institutions de facto simplify and make citizens better oﬀ, as compared to going through
the regular procedure. This is the essence of proposition 1. If we instead believe the
procedure is endogenously determined, the paper suggests a theory for how an institu-
tional setting, with a large and complicated bureaucracy, many intermediaries, and close
bureaucracy-intermediary interaction with a right for intermediaries to represent citizens
and preferential access at the bureaucracy, has emerged. Propositions 3 and 5 establish
the negative eﬀects on individuals’ licensing gain from such endogenous red tape.
The mutually beneﬁcial cooperation between bureaucrats and intermediaries may also
involve other professions such as notaries public and potentially accountants, beneﬁting
from a cumbersome regulation. Reforms of the government bureaucracy typically meet
ﬁerce resistance from such groups. As a Brazilian example of such reform resistance, in
addition to the citation in section 3, trade unions of despachantes have lobbied vis-a-
vis politicians to limit, delay or hinder bureaucracy simpliﬁcation reforms such as the
government ”one stop shop” PoupaTempo in the state of S˜ ao Paulo, a reform which is
likely to have reduced the use of despachante services over the past decade (for exam-
ples of articles concerning such lobbying eﬀorts, see Lima [30, 31]; for a presentation of
PoupaTempo, see Annenberg [2] and Paulics [35]). In Peru, notaries public have opposed
and attempted to reverse simpliﬁcations in land titling and property rights registration
(ILD [25]).28
A data collection on the prevalence and use of intermediaries in diﬀerent countries
could potentially allow for a validation of the endogenous red tape argument presented in
this paper, but also complement studies such as the Doing Business study at the World
Bank [46], in that de facto procedures that citizens use may diﬀer much from de jure
legal procedures (de Soto, [14]).
Reforms such as PoupaTempo, which physically co-locate many government author-
ities at the same location, provide a possibility to test the relevance of the theory of
28The magazine ”Despachante em foco” (Despachante in focus) from the trade union of ”Despachantes
documentalistas” in the state of S˜ ao Paulo is a publication discussing issues of concern to the bureaucracy
intermediary sector in S˜ ao Paulo. Among the issues brought up are eﬀorts of the union to get access for
its members to the computerized registries of the transport authorities, technical changes to this system,
the opening of a ”Central de atendimento ao despachante” (Despachante service desk) in conjunction
with a DETRAN building, to change the classiﬁcation of the profession in the Brazilian Occupation
Classiﬁcation (CBO in its Portuguese acronym) and to revoke a law that makes control of the profession
as t a t e -( a so p p o s e dt oaf e d e r a l - )m a t t e r[ 3 9 ] .
24intermediaries presented in this paper. As opposed to recent papers on bureaucracy in-
termediaries [20, 7], which focus on intermediaries’ role in facilitating rule-breaking, this
paper stresses the time-saving aspect. In the PoupaTempo example, citizens can access
the diﬀerent authorities required to get a license, at the same physical location. Care
has also been taken so that the citizen should be able to visit the diﬀerent authorities
within the same day. The procedure to get the license per se however, i.e. the rules and
regulations that the individual has to fulﬁll, have not changed. They are the same as if
the citizen uses the traditional procedure (which still exists). Ceteris paribus the reform
thus reduces the incentives to use an intermediary for time saving purposes, but for in-
dividuals that cannot fulﬁll rules and regulations the incentives to use an intermediary
do not change. With data on intermediary usage pre- and post reform, for treatment
and control groups, implementations such as PoupaTempo present a possibility to learn
more about which functions intermediaries primarily perform.
The literature on intermediaries is scarce, and this paper aims at providing a contri-
bution to the ﬁeld. It is worth mentioning the work of Brazilian anthropologist Roberto
DaMatta, with studies of the Brazilian social hierarchy [12, 13]. The importance of per-
sonal contacts with bureaucrats in order to get things accomplished can be interpreted
as a potential determinant of entry costs to become an intermediary. Intermediaries need
to cultivate such contacts in order to be able to eﬀectively handle license applications on
behalf of individuals. In societies where the bureaucracy is characterized by a rules-based
treatment and impersonal contacts between users of the bureaucracy (individuals, ﬁrms)
and neutral oﬃcials, it is probably more diﬃcult for a sector of intermediaries to emerge.
This description would correspond to a ”high f”. Obviously, there may be deeper under-
lying explanatory factors for the importance of personal contacts and the prevalence of
bureaucracy intermediaries. Notwithstanding, and as discussed in section 2, it is inter-
esting to note that Latin America, the region of the world where senior management of
ﬁrms spends most time with government regulation, a proxy for the amount of contact
with bureaucrats, is also a region where bureaucracy intermediaries are common.
In his characterization of citizens’ contact with public authorities in Brazil, Roberto
DaMatta describes the citizen-bureaucrat interaction, much diﬀerent from the ”Webe-
rian” case [13]. In brief, simplifying a comprehensive account but still following the
author closely: A citizen arriving at the government bureaucracy is ”someone who is
no-one” (algu´ em que ´ e ningu´ em), or just ”some individual” (indiv´ ıduo qualquer), and
solving his errand is ”not possible” (n˜ ao pode). However, it might be that a personal
link between the bureaucrat and the individual is discovered (having studied at the same
institution, being from the same city, having the same favorite team, having religion in
common, etc), which might facilitate a ”ﬁx” (jeitinho) in order to solve the errand. Such
personal ties are not always there however, and the citizen may resort to a despachante.
This intermediary, which has arisen as a result of the mismatch between the law and
daily life, is the specialist in entering in contacts with the public oﬃces, in resolving is-
sues and in obtaining a jeitinho from the authorities. DaMatta thus argues that personal
ties are important, and even though some or most citizens do not have them, there is
room for specialists in such personal ties to bureaucrats to develop, which will then act
as mediators in the hierarchy between the law/bureaucracy and ordinary citizens.
255.1. Conclusion
This paper presents a model of bureaucracy intermediaries, where the sector arises
endogenously as a result of bureaucrats’ maximization of rents from a license procedure.
The paper provides one explanation why license procedures tend to be long in developing
countries. Evidence on the mode of operation of bureaucracy intermediaries is presented,
and an empirical study that can potentially distinguish the theory presented here, from
other theories of intermediaries, is discussed.
AppendixA.
Proof of Proposition 4. We use the solutions in expressions 4 (bribe only), 12 (bribe and
intermediaries) and 16 (intermediary only). We ﬁrst establish, in the ﬁrst two paragraphs
below, the comparison between the solutions in (4) and (12). The n-thresholds referred
to, but not stated in the text, are given below.
For small n, proﬁts in the bribe only case is πs = αn
4 . With bribes and intermediaries,
for small n, proﬁts are Πs = n
4(1+f −2
￿
f(1 − α)) for f ≤ f1 = 1−α




f(1 − α)) for f1 ≤ f<f 2 = 1−α
4 . Both are larger than πs in their respective f-
ranges, with equality at f2 = 1−α
4 . The large-n solution for 0 ≤ f<f 2 = 1−α
4 , for which







which equal large-n proﬁts with bribes only, πl =
α(g−np)
2
4(1−α)n (from 4), at n = n(πl=Πl,m>1),
which is thus an upper crossing between the proﬁt curves. For f<f 2,w et h u sh a v e













2 (from 4) we thus always have the bribe
only solution when f ≥ f2. Higher entry costs will cause the bribe only, and bribe and
intermediary proﬁts, to cross at n>n ∗
1 (there is thus a lower, and an upper, crossing
between the proﬁt curves). In the middle-n region, from (4), the lower crossing point is




2(−2+α)3 and, above n∗
2 (from 4),




(8−α(11−4α))2 ), at n(πl=Πs). Finally,
the m = 1 constraint binds at the upper crossing between bribe proﬁts πl and bribe and








α , for f>
4(1−α)
(4−α)2 (which is always larger than f2), such that the upper crossing
is then n(πl=Πl,m=1). For f2 ≤ f<f max, we thus have bribe and intermediaries for an
intermediate-n range, where the n-thresholds depend on whether the bribe only, and the
bribe and intermediary, proﬁt functions intersect in the middle- or large- region of the
bribe only problem, and on whether the m = 1 constraint binds or not at the (upper-)
intersection where proﬁts are equal.
We now compare with expression 16, i.e. the intermediary only case, ﬁrst proving
that, for small n, this solution will never generate the largest proﬁts. For f<1
9,i n t e r m e -




f), and for f ≥ 1




These proﬁts, as all other small-n proﬁts, increase linearly in n. We compare these proﬁts
with the above established Πs for f ≤ f1 and f1 ≤ f<f 2, respectively. Solving for the
entry cost f that gives equality between each relevant pair, the (f,α)-parameter space
where ΠI
s ≥ Πs, always falls outside the parameter space where the respective solutions
apply. This holds up and above f = f2. Comparing ΠI
s with bribe only proﬁts πs, for
f<1
9, gives ΠI
s > πs only in an (f,α)-parameter space where the bribe and intermediary
solution applies and has a larger proﬁt, comparing ΠI
s and πs for f ≥ 1
9 yields the same
result. We have thus established that the intermediary only case never applies for small
n.
Solving for equality between ΠI
s = n(
√











which is always larger than f2. Because bribe only proﬁts start decreasing at a smaller
n than proﬁts with intermediaries only, there can thus exist an interval (i.e. for f ≥ ¯ f,
above n∗
1)i nw h i c hΠI
s holds, is larger than Πs, and is also larger than πl.T h i s i s
discussed in the next and ﬁnal paragraph of the proof. Because intermediary only proﬁts
start decreasing at a lower n than proﬁts with bribes and intermediaries, we can conclude
that, for 0 ≤ f<¯ f, the intermediary only solution is never part of bureaucrats’ optimal
choice, for any n. Such a solution was illustrated in ﬁgures 3 and 4A. The same is true
for ¯ ¯ f ≤ f<f max,w h e r e ¯ ¯ f is deﬁned below.
The intermediary only solution applies over a narrow parameter range for f ≥ ¯ f. Solv-
ing for equality between ΠI
s = n(
√
f −2f) and πl, we get the lower n-threshold n(ΠI
s=πl),




f (from 16), in order for ΠI
s to apply. n(ΠI
s=πl) is the
only relevant crossing point, the crossing between ΠI
l and πl occur outside of the region
where ΠI





f gives that entry costs can be no





(8−7α)2 (which is always less than fmax).
The ¯ ¯ f threshold, in turn, is only larger than ¯ f for α < 0.42135 ≈ 0.42, which is thus the
largest α for which the intermediary only solution applies. In the interval ¯ f ≤ f<¯ ¯ f
we will have an intermediate-n interval with the intermediary only solution. The upper
n-threshold depends on the curvature of the three proﬁt curves, and there are two cases.
For ¯ f ≤ f<˜ f it holds between n(ΠI
s=πl) and n(ΠI
l =Πs), where the latter threshold solves
ΠI
l = Πs. The proﬁt curves never intersect in the large-n region of the bribe and inter-
mediary case. For ˜ f ≤ f<¯ ¯ f the intermediary only solution holds between n(ΠI
s=πl) and
n(ΠI
l =πl), which solves ΠI
l = πl, and where ˜ f solves n(ΠI
l =πl) = n(ΠI
l =πl).
To summarize, for α < 0.42, there is a narrow f-range, ¯ f ≤ f<¯ ¯ f,w i t hf2 < ¯ f<¯ ¯ f<
fmax, for which intermediary only proﬁts are largest in an intermediate-n range. There
are two cases. With ¯ f ≤ f<˜ f, for increasing n, the solution is bribe only, intermediary
only, bribe- and intermediary, then the bribe only solution up to nmax.W i t h˜ f ≤ f<¯ ¯ f,
for increasing n, the solution is bribe only, intermediary only, bribe only, bribe- and
intermediary, then the bribe only solution up to nmax. Figure 4B displays the solution,















































































Proof of Proposition 5. First note that the intermediary only solution will not be a part
of the solution when n is endogenous. Maximal proﬁts, over the range that this solution




f (i.e. up to the n for which the small-n solution, with
m = 1 applies, see the proof above and 16). For this n, proﬁts ΠI
s = n(
√
f − 2f) are
always smaller, for the relevant f, than maximum proﬁts in the bribe only model.
We use the notation n∗ for the optimal length of the bureaucratic procedure, irrespec-
tive if it is generated by the bribe and intermediary, or the bribe only model. Maximal
proﬁts in the bribe and intermediary model are given by maximization of large-n proﬁts,
which in the unconstrained case (m>1) equal Πl,m>1, and in the constrained case equal

















(p + 1)(p +1− α − 2
￿
f(1 − α)) + f(1 + α)
(A.2)
The former solution is feasible up to the point where the m = 1-constraint starts






(from 12). Solving for equality gives that
the unconstrained optimum in (A.1) holds for f<f ∗. Above this entry cost level, the
constrained large-n solution in (A.2) applies. This solution, in turn, is optimal as long
as proﬁts are larger than in the bribe only case, for which the optimal procedure length
n∗ =
g √
(1+p)(1+p−α) was derived in (6). Equating optimal bribe only proﬁts from (6),
with proﬁts from (A.2), we get f = f∗∗ (both f-thresholds were given in the main text).
The procedure length that maximizes bureaucracy proﬁts is thus:
28n∗ =

    












if f∗ ≤ f<f ∗∗
g √
(1+p)(1+p−α) if f∗∗ ≤ f<f max
It is straightforward to check that n∗ with either 0 ≤ f<f ∗ or f∗ ≤ f<f ∗∗ is
strictly greater than when the bribe only solution applies (solve for equality w.r.t. f and
check that the solution falls outside its permitted interval).
With respect to the aggregate gain, individuals who use the regular bureaucracy are
always worse oﬀ as n increases. By plugging in the optimal n in the B-expressions (for
0 ≤ f<f ∗, the solution with d = g,m > 1 and for f∗ ≤ f<f ∗∗, the solution with
d = g,m = 1), and in the expressions for the threshold between bribing and the regular
bureaucracy (
B−np
αn ), one can show that bribes are always larger, and the thresholds
are always smaller, than in the the bribe only model. The two eﬀects go in the same
direction and reduce the aggregate gain in comparison with the bribe only model. Because
d = g, individuals using intermediaries have zero net gain, which is lower than for the
corresponding individuals in the bribe only model, the aggregate of individuals must be
worse oﬀ with bribes and intermediaries.
The derivative ∂n
∗
∂f is always negative for 0 ≤ f<f ∗, but can change sign in the
middle interval, depending on the values of p and α. The aggregate individual gain





2n (using deﬁnition 1).
Plugging in n∗ and diﬀerentiating w.r.t. f gives
∂G(n
∗)




∂f is always negative when 0 ≤ f<f ∗.
29References
[1] Ankarcrona, C., 2005. Russian Customs Barriers: Experiences from a Swedish Perspective. Mimeo,
Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE).
[2] Annenberg, D., 2006. Poupatempo Program: The Citizen Service Center and its Innovations.
Presented at the World Bank, E-Development Services Thematic Group; Shared Service Delivery




[3] Banerjee, A., Hanna, R., Mullainathan, S., 2009. Corruption. Mimeo, MIT.
[4] Bardhan, P., 1997. Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues. Journal of Economic Litera-
ture 25, 1320–1346.
[5] Bertrand, M., Djankov, S., Hanna, R., Mullainathan, S., 2007. Obtaining a Driving License in
India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122,
1639-1676.
[6] Bertrand, M., Djankov, S., Hanna, R., Mullainathan, S., 2008. Corruption in Driving Licenses in
Delhi, Economic and Political Weekly 43 (5), 71-76.
[7] Bose, G., Gangopadhyay, S., 2009. Intermediation in corruption markets. Indian Growth and De-
velopment Review 2, 39 - 55.
[8] Castor, B., 2002. Brazil is not for amateurs: Patterns of Governance in the land of ”jeitinho”. USA:
Xlibris Corporation.
[9] CIEN (Centro de Investigaciones Econmicas Nacionales), 2001. An´ alisis de la econom´ ıa informal en
Guatemala. Estudio de casos: entrevistas a micro y peque˜ nos empresarios.
[10] CIET (Centro de Investigaci´ on de Enfermedades Tropicales), 1998a: Bolivia (REP): Perceptions of
the population concerning corruption in public services.
[11] CIET, 1998b: Bolivia (REP): Perception of the private sector on corruption in public services.
[12] DaMatta, R., 1979. Carnavais, malandros e her´ ois: para uma sociologia do dilema brasileiro. Rio
de Janeiro: Rocco.
[13] DaMatta, R., 1984. O que faz o brasil, Brasil? Rio de Janeiro: Rocco.
[14] de Soto, H., 1989. The Other Path. New York: Harper and Row.
[15] de Soto, H., 2000. The mystery of capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the west and fails everywhere
else. New York: Basic Books.
[16] Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2002. The Regulation of Entry. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 1-37.
[17] Fjeldstad, O., 2003. Fighting ﬁscal corruption: lessons from the Tanzania revenue authority. Public
Administration and Development 23, 165-175.
[18] Gancheva, Y. 1999. Rules, Regulations and Transactions Costs in Transition Bulgaria. Institute for
Market Economics, RSS 993/1999.
[19] Grisham, J. 2005. The testament. New York: Random House Inc.
[20] Hasker, K., Okten, C., 2008. Intermediaries and corruption. Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization 67, 103–115.
[21] Husted, B. 1994. Honor among Thieves: A Transaction-Cost Interpretation of Corruption in Third
World Countries. Business Ethics Quarterly 4, 17-27.
[22] IFC, 2007a. Business Simpliﬁcation in Lima, Peru - An evaluation of the reform of licensing proce-
dures.
[23] IFC, 2007b. Municipal scorecard. Midiendo las barreras burocr´ aticas a nivel municipal - reporte
Bolivia.
[24] IFC, 2008. Reforma del proceso para obtener permiso de operaci´ on de negocio en las alcald´ ıas
municipales del distrito central y San Pedro Sula.
[25] ILD, 2007. The war of notary publics. Do you know what would happen if Peru lost the war over
state reform? Lima: Institute for Liberty and Democracy.
[26] IMF, 2012. World Economic Outlook Database, 9 Jan 2012
<http://www.imf.org/>.
[27] Lambsdorﬀ,J . ,2 0 0 2 .M a k i n gc o r r u p td e a l s : c o n t r a c t i n gi nt h es h a d o wo ft h el a w .J o u r n a lo f
Economic Behavior and Organization 48, 221-241.
[28] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1999. The Quality of Government.
Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations 15, 222-279.
[29] Levine, V., 1975. Political corruption: the Ghana case. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
30[30] Lima, R., 2005a. Despachantes fazem lobby para barrar o Poupatempo. 17 Nov. 2005. 9 Jan 2012
<http://www.diarioweb.com.br/editorial/corpo_noticia.asp?IdCategoria=1&IdNoticia=
69158&IdGrupo=1>.
[31] Lima, R., 2005b. Poupatempo aprovado. diarioweb.com.br, 17 Nov. 2005. 9 Jan 2012
<http://www.diarioweb.com.br/editorial/corpo_noticia.asp?IdCategoria=1&IdNoticia=
69248&IdGrupo=1>.
[32] Lui, F., 1985. An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery. Journal of Political Economy 93, 760–781.
[33] Myrdal, G., 1968. Asian drama: An inquiry into the poverty of nations. New York: Twentieth
Century Fund.
[34] Oldenburg, P., 1987. Middlemen in third-world corruption: Implications of an Indian case. World
Politics 39, 508-535.
[35] Paulics, V., 2003. PoupaTempo, Central de Atendimento ao Cidad˜ ao. In ”20 Experiˆ encias de Gest˜ ao
P´ ublica e Cidadania”. S˜ ao Paulo: Programa Gest˜ ao P´ ublica e Cidadania.
[36] Pro´ etica, 2006. Segunda encuesta nacional sobre corrupcin - breve anlisis de los resultados.
[37] Rosenn, K., 1971. The jeito, Brazils institutional bypass of the formal legal system and its devel-
opmental implications. The American Journal of Comparative law, 514-549.
[38] Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1993. Corruption. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 599-617.
[39] SINDESP, 2012. Sindicato dos Despachantes Documentalistas no Estado de S˜ ao Paulo. Jornal em
Foco, various issues. 9 Jan 2012
<http://www.sindespachantes.com.br/sind/jornal.asp>.
[40] Stone, A., Levy, B., Paredes, R., 1996. Public Institutions and Private Transactions: A Comparative
Analysis of the Legal and Regulatory Environment for Business Transactions in Brazil and Chile,
in ”Empirical studies in institutional change” (Alston, Eggertsson and North eds). New York:
Cambridge University Press, 95-128.
[41] Svensson, J., 2005. Eight Questions about Corruption. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (3),
19-42.
[42] Tanzi, V., 1998. Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures. IMF
Staﬀ Papers, 45 (4), 559-594.
[43] Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 9 Jan 2012
<http://www.transparency.org/>.
[44] World Bank, 1996. Guatemala: building peace with rapid and equitable growth. Report No. 15352-
GU.
[45] World Bank, 2012a. Enterprise Surveys, Regulations and Taxes, 9 Jan 2012
<http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/>.
[46] World Bank, 2012b. Doing Business, Ease of Doing Business, 9 Jan 2012
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/>.
[47] Yakovlev, E., Zhuravskaya, E., 2012. The Unequal Enforcement of Liberalization: Evidence from
Russia’s Reform of Business Regulation. Journal of European Economic Association (In press).
[48] Zylbersztajn, D., Faccioli, F., Silveira, R., 2007. Measuring the start up costs in Brazilian small
ﬁrms. Revista de Administrao da Universidade de S˜ ao Paulo 42, 293-301.
[49] Zylbersztajn, D., Gra¸ ca, C., 2003. Los costos de la formalizaci´ on empresarial: medici´ on de los costos




Figure 1. Solution as a function of n. The graph displays, for each procedure length 
n, the amount of licenses awarded (upper solid line), and the distribution of 
individuals that get the license from the regular bureaucracy, bribe, or that do not get 
the license at all. The dot-dashed line is the productivity level below which individuals 
get the license when only the option of the regular bureaucracy is available. 
 
g=1, p=0.1, alfa=2/3 
  
 
Figure 2. Bureaucracy profits (solid, inverted U), individuals’ aggregate gain (dot-
dashed) and sum of profits, gain and time costs (upper solid curve), as functions of n. 
  
g=1, p=0.1, alfa=2/3 
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Size of intermediary sector, 0  f  f1
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Figure 3. Solution as a function of n, for three different entry costs f. Bureaucracy profits (panels A, C, E) 
and size of the intermediary sector (panels B, D, F). In each profit graph the profits from the bribe and 
intermediary model (solid), and from the bribe only model is shown (the latter curve, dashed, remains the 
same in all three panels). The dotted line in panels B and D is m=1. 
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Figure 4A. Solution in (n, f) – space, for large values of alfa (0.42). The five areas in 
the graph corresponds to the (n, f)-parameter space where each of the solutions to 
the bribe and intermediary model have highest profits. Direct bribing and 
intermediaries coexist for four of the five different solutions, i.e. QB=0 binds only over 
a very limited parameter space. Outside of the five areas, i.e. above the uppermost 
curve, the optimal solution is the bribe only solution, i.e. m=0.  
 
g=1, p=0.1, alfa=2/3  
 
 
Figure 4B..Solution for small values of alfa (<0.42). The small area above f2, marked 
in gray, is the parameter space for which the intermediary-only solution is optimal. All 
other aspects of the solution are as in figure 4A. 
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Panel A                          Panel C 
 
    
Panel B                           Panel D 
 
 
Figure 5. Solution when n is endogenous, as a function of the entry cost f (solid line). 
Bureaucracy profits (panel A), aggregate individual gain (B), length of bureaucratic procedure 
(C) and size of the intermediary sector (D). The dashed line shows profits, gain and length of 
the procedure for the bribe only solution. 
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